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Abstract: In light of increasing interest in metacognition and its role in recovery from psy-
chosis, a range of new treatments focused on addressing metacognitive deficits have emerged. 
These include Metacognitive Therapy, Metacognitive Training, metacognitive insight and 
reflection therapy, and metacognitive interpersonal therapy for psychosis. While each of 
these treatments uses the term metacognitive, each differs in terms of their epistemological 
underpinnings, their structure, format, presumed mechanisms of action, and primary out-
comes. To clarify how these treatments converge and diverge, we first offer a brief history of 
metacognition as well as its potential role in an individual’s response to and recovery from 
complicated mental health conditions including psychosis. We then review the background, 
practices, and supporting evidence for each treatment. Finally, we will offer a framework 
for thinking about how each of these approaches may ultimately complement rather than 
contradict one another and highlight areas for development. We suggest first that each is 
concerned with something beyond what people with psychosis think about themselves and 
their lives. Each of these four approaches is interested in how patients with severe mental 
illness think about themselves. Each looks at immediate reactions and ideas that frame the 
meaning of thoughts. Second, each of these approaches is more concerned with why people 
make dysfunctional decisions and take maladaptive actions rather than what comprised those 
decisions and actions. Third, despite their differences, each of these treatments is true to the 
larger construct of metacognition and is focused on person’s relationships to their mental 
experiences, promoting various forms of self-understanding which allow for better self-
management. Each can be distinguished from other cognitive and skills-based approaches 
to the treatment of psychosis in their emphasis on sense-making rather than learning a new 
specific thing to say, think, or do in a given situation.
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Introduction
The past two decades have seen an increasing interest in understanding the role of the 
mind as evidenced in psychological states. Evidenced in research is the development 
of theory around such notions as theory of mind, mentalization, reflective functioning, 
and metacognition. At the same time, we have witnessed a renewed interest in address-
ing deficits associated with some of the most debilitating psychological disorders, 
as seen with the introduction of a range of new treatments focused on addressing 
metacognitive deficits for patients presenting with psychosis including schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders. Some of these interventions, such as Metacognitive Training1 and 
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metacognitive insight and reflection therapy (MERIT),2 were 
developed in response to the challenges posed by psychosis 
and the deficits associated with psychotic processes includ-
ing compromised coherence of self-experience. Two others, 
Metacognitive Therapy3,4 and metacognitive interpersonal 
therapy for psychosis (MIT-P)5,6 drew upon alternative 
epistemologies. As therapies, Metacognitive Therapy and 
MIT-P were originally applied to other clinical groups and 
later adapted for psychosis. Each of these therapies differs 
significantly in terms of their epistemological underpinnings, 
their structure, format, presumed mechanisms of action, and 
primary outcomes. As has been noted elsewhere,7 this is 
potentially confusing because each treatment uses the term 
metacognition; this may obstruct an understanding of how 
these treatments might complement one another both in terms 
of clinical utility as well as their contributions to understand-
ing disturbances in human consciousness and behavior.
To add clarity to this picture, the current review will 
explore the background, practices, and supporting evidence 
for the four metacognitive therapies currently available for 
psychosis: Metacognitive Therapy, Metacognitive Training, 
MERIT, and MIT-P. To provide additional clarity, we will 
first offer a brief history of metacognition as well as its 
potential role in an individual’s response to and recovery from 
complicated mental health conditions including psychosis. 
Finally, we will offer a framework for thinking about how 
each of these approaches may ultimately complement (rather 
than rival) one another and highlight areas for development.
A brief history of interest in 
metacognition
Ancient through contemporary philosophy is replete with 
work on the nature of human reflection as an essential human 
activity. Socrates’ famous dictum “Know thyself,” found 
across several of Plato’s dialogues, is posited as the means 
for understanding how to make sense of one’s life. Pascal’s 
dictum: “Man is a reed, the weakest of nature, but he is a 
thinking reed” supports the thought that reflection and our 
sense of ourselves is what makes us human.
In the field of psychology, James8 was possibly the first to 
develop a theory of self that included the notion of the “me” 
and the “I.” Within this paradigm, the “I” has the capacity 
to know itself, that is, a capacity for self-observation, while 
the “me” refers to the individual as object. This gave rise to 
the duplex self, such that the total self is comprised of both 
object and subject.8 He also introduced the idea of stream 
of consciousness, which again is intrinsic to sense of self.
Despite the centrality of notions of self-awareness, 
self-monitoring, and self-direction within the study of the 
humanities, one of the first formal efforts in psychology 
that unified these constructs came when Flavell9 formally 
proposed using the term metacognition to capture aspects of 
consciousness intimately related to these processes. Flavell’s9 
primary interest in utilizing this term was to address issues 
facing developmental psychology, including the effects 
(potentially positive and negative) of learners’ awareness of 
their learning and the cognitive processes that enable learning 
to progress. He writes that a child’s ability to “distinguish…
between understanding and not understanding things” could 
change how they behave in educational settings9 (p. 909). As 
noted by Moritz and Lysaker,7 Flavell’s9 original model of 
metacognition also extended beyond the educational context 
and thoughts that are about other thoughts to include forms of 
self-awareness and their culmination in measurable attitudes 
and actions.
Within the antipodes, there have been similar develop-
ments, with the work of Robert Hobson and Meares and the 
development of the conversational model.10 Meares defines 
the sense of self in terms of a more or less continuous flow 
of feelings which constitute mental life, that is, images, 
thoughts, imaginings, and memories. These experiences are 
often associated with reverie.10 The theoretical implications 
have been applied to the psychotherapy of patients present-
ing with borderline states. In contemporary psychoanalytic 
theory, similar ideas are described in terms of the require-
ments of “the other” for the emergence of the mind. That is, 
the mind is never isolated, but emerges in conversation with 
others. Important extensions of the work of Flavell were 
made by Nelsonet al.,11 whose model on object versus meta-
level has been incorporated in the metacognitive account by 
Wells, as well as Koriat,12,13 whose emphasis on confidence 
as a metacognitive process is prominent in the account by 
Moritz and Lysaker.7
Since the original definition of metacognition, psy-
chologists and researchers from related fields have studied 
metacognition in the context of broader human development 
including attachment,14 various cognitive functions including 
memory and the experience of certainty,15,16 and the experi-
ence of following one’s own cognitive processes as decisions 
are made and the confidence associated with this process.1 
Multiple authors have sought to divide metacognition into 
discrete activities including those which support planning, 
monitoring behavior, and evaluating outcomes of behavior, 
as well as those related to knowledge of oneself, knowledge 
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of strategies, and knowledge of when and where certain 
strategies are likely to work.17–19
Focusing on psychopathology, Wells20 was among the 
first to suggest that metacognitive beliefs people have about 
their cognitions affect how persons respond to distress and 
psychosocial challenges leading to emotional disorders (ie, 
anxiety, depression). Wells further distinguished himself as 
advancing cognitive theory and therapy by differentiating 
these beliefs about beliefs from other cognitive content and 
tying adaptive changes in these to enhanced awareness of 
one’s own cognitive processes and self-regulation. In this 
sense, his concept is essentially a single-person model of 
metacognition. Also focusing on psychopathology, Semerari 
et al21 sought to further develop the construct of metacogni-
tion in at least two ways. First, in the tradition of Flavell,9 
they were careful to note that metacognitive acts can be 
distinguished from one another on the basis of whether the 
acts are focused on self, others, or the use of that knowledge, 
and disturbance in different forms might result in different 
forms of psychopathology. In this sense, they extended the 
model to a two-person model. They additionally proposed 
metacognition could be conceptualized as a series of modular 
functions that applied to each of these foci (eg, differentia-
tion of mental states and understanding how mental experi-
ences interact).
Focusing on core symptoms of schizophrenia, Moritz et 
al,1 employed the construct of metacognition to suggest how 
individuals can become aware of their own cognitive distor-
tions and in particular how they can reduce overconfidence 
in false judgments and ultimately delusional beliefs. In 
parallel, Lysaker et al22,23 modified the model and approach 
developed by Semerari et al21 in order to understand basic 
psychological mechanisms at play in psychotic disorders. 
In what was later referred to as the integrated model of 
metacognition,24 they proposed that metacognition could be 
conceptualized as a spectrum of activities which range from 
discrete activities (eg, noticing specific mental states) to more 
synthetic activities (eg, integrating discrete experiences into 
a complex sense of self and others in a given moment). This 
model retained the original distinctions made by Semerari et 
al,21 which separated metacognitive acts into ones concerned 
with the self, others, and the use of that knowledge. It also 
proposed that within each domain of metacognitive acts or 
metacognition, different levels could be distinguished on 
the basis of their level of integration. Further, to be able to 
perform more complex acts of integration, the more discrete 
functions have to be operating at a sufficient level, otherwise 
there would not be material available to integrate. In this 
sense, metacognition can be conceptualized as divisible into 
distinct hierarchical levels.
The potential role of metacognitive 
processes in recovery from serious 
mental illness
As metacognition has been thought to be foundational to 
human adaptation and communication, research has rapidly 
developed exploring whether deficits or alterations in meta-
cognitive function may help explain the development and 
maintenance of mental health conditions. The construct of 
metacognition has frequently been applied to understanding 
serious mental illnesses including psychotic disorders such as 
schizophrenia. Before we detail these different approaches, 
it seems important to discuss some of the reasons for this 
explosion in interest. First, in the wake of singular and per-
haps myopic focus on the biological processes which may 
underpin these disorders, the field has lacked solid models 
of the psychological processes which contribute to disorder, 
which can explain disturbances misattributed to simplistic 
disturbances in biological processes and which could be 
the target of treatment. These models are needed in order 
to develop psychosocial treatments that promote wellness 
beyond the positive symptom reduction afforded by pharma-
cological treatments that, regardless of their efficacy, involve 
agents that have significant negative side effects.
Models in which alterations in metacognitive processes 
are implicated in serious mental illness are good candidates 
to fill that void for several reasons. Intuitively, metacogni-
tion has a clear place as a moderator in the flow from social 
and biological disturbances to consciousness and behavior. 
Phenomena such as symptoms, neurocognitive compro-
mise, and trauma and stigma do not just affect the life of a 
person directly; they elicit perceptions, interpretations, and 
responses from the individual that in turn affect if and how 
these phenomena influence his or her life.25 As such, altera-
tions in metacognition are linked to how significant experi-
ences and events unfold and affect persons as well. Indeed, 
deficits in metacognition would potentially negatively affect 
the development and course of symptoms as well as an indi-
vidual’s ability to recognize and respond to social adversity 
and ultimately take charge of one’s own recovery.
Four emerging treatments
Metacognitive Therapy
Background
Metacognitive Therapy4 bases its approach on the notion that 
disorder (ie, generalized anxiety disorder, depression, etc) is 
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caused not by the content of one’s thoughts, as is posited by 
traditional cognitive behavioral therapy, but instead by the 
way in which one’s thought processes are controlled and the 
style in which this is executed.26 The Self-Regulatory Execu-
tive Function (S-REF) model of dysfunctional processing 
provides the basis for this supposition.27 According to this 
model an individual’s cognitive functioning is comprised of 
three levels: automatic processing, voluntary processing that 
places demands on one’s attention, and stored knowledge 
and beliefs about oneself. The S-REF model provides an 
explanation of how bottom–up (eg, intrusions) in conjunction 
with top–down processes (especially metacognitive beliefs) 
contribute to the choice of coping mechanisms that impact 
psychological well-being.
Practice
The thinking style associated with the S-REF is the Cog-
nitive Attentional Syndrome (CAS).26 This syndrome is 
considered a universal feature of emotional disorder and 
consists of three parts: worry and rumination, threat moni-
toring, and behaviors like avoidance or thought suppression 
that serve to impair self-control and/or prevent corrective 
learning experiences. Especially in his older work, Wells28 
distinguished between Type I and Type II worrying. While 
Type II is meta-worry (ie, worry about worry such as “I’m 
losing out in life because of worrying”), Type 1 relates to 
worry about noncognitive events such as external situa-
tions.28 These three features are the areas targeted as part 
of Metacognitive Therapy; it employs attention training,29 
detached mindfulness,30 and situational attentional refocus-
ing.31 The basic principle is that individuals must know the 
best way to respond to threat and negative thoughts; in other 
words, reduce the CAS. Techniques from standard cogni-
tive behavioral therapy (CBT) may be used (ie, behavioral 
experiments, examining the evidence), but these approaches 
are targeted not at the content of the cognition but instead at 
the metacognitive beliefs about one’s thoughts.
In psychosis, negative thoughts are conceptualized by 
Hutton et al32 as the trigger for distress rather than psychotic 
experiences themselves. Dimensions of worry have been 
shown to be associated with dimensions of delusional ide-
ation, and “meta-worry” is associated with distress related 
to hallucinatory experiences.33 Individuals experiencing 
auditory hallucinations tend to demonstrate higher levels 
of dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs, and those with 
delusional beliefs bear similarities to individuals with panic 
disorder.34 The developers of this treatment suggest that these 
findings are indicative of an individual’s beliefs (ie, worry 
and subsequent rumination) about their experiences of psy-
chosis being the cause of distress rather than the content of 
the experiences (ie, delusions, hallucinations) themselves.
Metacognitive beliefs about these experiences may also 
predispose individuals to hallucinations, such that dysfunc-
tional beliefs can contribute to the misattribution of intrusive 
thoughts to external sources, thus leading to hallucina-
tions.35,36 Metacognitive processes are also hypothesized to 
be associated with the development and maintenance of para-
noia; metacognitive worry has been shown to be correlated 
with both cognitive and emotional dimensions of delusional 
beliefs,35 and may be a means by which individuals manage 
interpersonal threat.37 Indeed, consistent with the S-REF 
model, positive beliefs about paranoia have been associated 
with suspiciousness, and negative beliefs about it are related 
to persecutory delusions.37 Some research has also indicated 
that dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs are predictive of 
negative affect, perceptions of recovery, and quality of life 
in individuals with psychosis, above and beyond frequency 
and severity of positive symptoms.38,39
A recent systematic review of the literature demonstrated 
an association between the CAS and experiences of psychosis 
and suggested that the CAS has important implications for 
distress associated with these.40 However, a recent meta-
analysis concluded that dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs 
may be primarily associated with psychological disorder and 
distress defined broadly, rather than with specific diagnoses.41 
Another recent literature review and meta-analysis concluded 
that the model proposed by Morrison et al36 regarding the 
association between hallucination-proneness and dysfunc-
tional metacognitive beliefs in clinical samples is not strongly 
supported by the literature.42 They suggest that these previ-
ously observed relationships are in fact quite heterogeneous, 
and when accounting for comorbid symptoms, appear to be 
rather weak. As such, it is still unclear whether the models 
proposed by Wells and colleagues have specific applica-
tions to the development and maintenance of psychosis, or 
whether they are indicative of a broader set of risk factors 
for the development of psychological distress and disorder.
Evidence
Metacognitive Therapy has demonstrated effectiveness in 
several different disorders, including generalized anxiety 
disorder,43 posttraumatic stress disorder,44–46 obsessive com-
pulsive disorder,47 and depression.48 It has also recently been 
expanded to a group format for individuals with depression, 
which demonstrated acceptability and feasibility as well as 
a reduction in mood and cognitive symptoms associated 
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with depression in both an open trial49 and a small baseline-
controlled trial.50 Most trials are small single-blind studies or 
case studies; as such, more research is needed to strengthen 
the conclusions drawn by this research.
The utility of Metacognitive Therapy for individuals with 
psychosis has been promising but limited thus far. A single 
case study incorporated elements of Metacognitive Therapy 
into a short-term CBT intervention and demonstrated a 
decrease in the experience of positive symptoms.51 Another 
case study utilized attention training after a course of CBT 
and also noted a decrease in positive symptoms and a shift in 
beliefs about the power of the hallucinations.52 A case series 
of three individuals with schizophrenia who received sev-
eral sessions of Metacognitive Therapy suggested that there 
was some clinically significant improvement across several 
symptom domains,32 and an open trial with ten individuals 
with schizophrenia also demonstrated preliminary evidence 
that Metacognitive Therapy is feasible and can result in some 
symptom reduction.3
Metacognitive Training
Background
Metacognitive Training53 is a training program, mainly 
delivered in a group format (though an individual version 
has been developed; for ease of exposition we will confine 
the summary to the group version), aimed at addressing the 
cognitive biases that underlie delusions through a combi-
nation of cognitive remediation, CBT for psychosis, and 
psychoeducation. Metacognitive Training is predicated on 
the assumption that these biases represent escalations of 
normal thinking styles. Individuals with psychosis have less 
insight into these biases;54 impairment may play a role in their 
perpetuation as well. The primary thinking errors targeted 
include jumping to conclusions, attributional biases, and 
overconfidence in errors, all of which have been identified 
as central to delusional ideas.55,56
Practice
Metacognitive Training aims to “sow seeds of doubt”1 
through corrective experiences. This includes presenting neu-
tral scenarios that gently encourage participants to question 
the conclusions they draw, which is a nonthreatening way to 
begin the process of reducing the conviction that often accom-
panies delusions. The modules of Metacognitive Training 
include a significant focus on jumping to conclusions and a 
tendency for overconfidence, as these are seen as the primary 
bases for turning neutral judgments into delusions. The aim 
is twofold – these cognitive biases are normalized with the 
hope of reducing stigma and increasing hope, and psycho-
education about the increased tendency for these biases in 
individuals with psychosis is provided so as to encourage 
self-efficacy and decrease certainty in one’s judgments. 
Discussion of the content of the delusions is generally kept 
to a minimum so as to emphasize the metacognitive nature 
of the training and decrease the possibility for experiences 
of shame or embarrassment.7
Evidence
Metacognitive Training has been primarily used in individuals 
with psychosis on both an inpatient and outpatient basis.1,54 
Metacognitive Training is well tolerated and well-received 
by patients and is even perceived as “fun,”56 which has 
been recently confirmed in a meta-analysis showing that 
acceptance is high.57 Most studies demonstrated small to 
medium effect sizes in the reduction of positive symptoms at 
the conclusion of the training, and two studies demonstrate 
longer-term effects.58,59 This has been substantiated by two 
meta-analyses showing significant effects on delusions.57,60 
It has demonstrated good results against psychoeducation 
in a recent-onset psychosis group.61 Metacognitive Training 
has also been modified for use in other disorders including 
obsessive compulsive disorder,62 bipolar disorder,63 border-
line personality disorder,64 and depression,65 with improve-
ment across various symptom and functional domains. These 
modified approaches are a more straightforward hybrid of 
Metacognitive Training and CBT and aim to provide the same 
metacognitive experiences to patients as a means to correct 
inaccurate beliefs.
MERIT
Background
MERIT, in contrast to many other therapeutic approaches, 
was developed in response to emerging research conducted 
first in the United States, but then replicated internation-
ally. MERIT is based on the assertion that individuals with 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders experience deficits in the 
ability to form a complex and integrated sense of self and 
others. These deficits are predictive, independent of illness 
severity, with concurrent and prospective functional capaci-
ties and can change through psychotherapy.24,66 MERIT’s 
procedures were developed through extensive exchanges 
among many clinicians and international researchers inti-
mately familiar with longer-term psychotherapies for adults 
with psychosis. These conversations, which took place 
over the course of a year, sought to identify core processes 
that go beyond common factors and promote growth in 
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metacognitive capacity. Each process, it was agreed, had to 
be measurable but also integrative in nature, or something 
that could be implemented by therapists from a range of 
psychotherapeutic backgrounds. The overarching therapy 
was thus conceptualized as recovery-oriented rather than as 
a symptom- or problem-focused approach, with a hypoth-
esized therapeutic action proceeding along the following 
steps: 1) MERIT promotes greater metacognitive capacity; 
2) with greater metacognition capacity, persons have access 
to a more integrated sense of self and others available in the 
moment; 3) with access to a more integrated sense of self 
and others in the moment, patients are better able to evolve 
a personally meaningful idea about what recovery means 
to them; and 4) with a more personally meaningful idea 
about what recovery means to the patient, they will be able 
to direct their own recovery more fully. Because MERIT is 
responsive to individual patients’ fluctuating levels of meta-
cognitive capacity, it is a therapy for all patients regardless 
of severity or phase of disorder, provided they can and do 
consent to treatment.2
Practice
In the MERIT model, the growth in metacognitive capacity 
is proposed as analogous to what takes places in physical 
therapy. Patients in MERIT work at their maximal level 
of metacognitive capacity as they think about themselves, 
think about others, and think about themselves in relation to 
others within a session. In MERIT the process of reflection, 
however, is considered to be joint or something that occurs 
between persons. MERIT therapists do not direct patients on 
what to think about but think together with patients about 
what is occurring in the patient’s mind and what is occurring 
between the therapist and patient. Over time, they become 
able to perform more complex metacognitive acts just as 
patients in physical therapy work at their maximal capacity 
physically and become better able to do the things they used 
to be able to do.
MERIT consists of eight elements. These are not a set of 
activities executed in a certain order nor a curriculum that is 
taught in a certain order. Instead, they reflect processes that 
promote metacognition within each given session. The ele-
ments are interrelated and are intended to be synergistic, but 
they can occur independently. The eight elements are divided 
into three classes. The first are the content elements, which 
focus on content that should be present in a session. These 
are (element 1) attention to the patient’s agenda (ie, wishes 
and needs in the moment) with the understanding that there 
may be multiple agendas, which may change throughout ses-
sions; (element 2) the patient’s experience of the therapist’s 
reactions and thoughts about the patient in the moment; 
(element 3) narrative episodes or the patient’s experience 
within the flow of unique life events; and (element 4) iden-
tification of a psychological challenge the patient is facing 
in life. The second set of elements comprises the process 
elements. These require ongoing reflection of processes 
in the moment and include (element 5) discussion of the 
therapeutic relationship, within which reflections subsumed 
in the first four elements are taking place, and (element 6) 
discussion of the general effects of the session in terms of 
changes or lack of changes in the patient’s mind (eg, differ-
ent thoughts, feelings, or wishes that emerged or changed) 
as the session unfolded.
The final two elements are the superordinate elements 
and offer principles that apply to all the previous elements. 
The first of the superordinate elements (element 7) requires 
therapists to enter into a collaborative relationship with the 
patient, during which the therapist may share what is on his 
or her mind, and their reflections about patients’ thoughts 
about themselves or others that match and do not exceed 
patients’ metacognitive abilities. In parallel, the final ele-
ment (element 8) requires therapists to stimulate thinking 
about and match patients’ use of metacognitive knowledge 
to collaboratively discuss ways in which they respond to 
psychosocial challenges. Here, there is joint reflection 
about both the psychosocial challenges the patient is fac-
ing but also how they as a unique person are responding 
to the challenge. As in the previous element, there is joint 
reflection about responses to these challenges that do not 
exceed patients’ capacities for metacognitive mastery. These 
last elements are intended to ensure that self-reflectivity, 
awareness of others, and mastery are stimulated in ways 
that match patients’ metacognitive capacity for each domain 
and thereby offer the maximal opportunity for growth in 
metacognitive activity. Operational definitions of adher-
ence for each element and criteria for overall adherence 
are available.2
Evidence
Research supporting MERIT comes from four sources. 
First, case reports indicate that therapists can successfully 
deliver MERIT in routine settings and adapt the therapy to 
the unique needs of very different patients.67–74 Second, the 
results of two qualitative studies suggest that there are unique 
benefits of MERIT related to the attainment of agency and a 
more diverse and rich sense of self.75,76 Third, two open trials 
confirm that the intervention can be delivered and accepted 
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by patients under routine conditions in outpatient settings 
and that it can lead to clinically meaningful change. One 
open trial formally followed MERIT in a 12 week interven-
tion period;77 another fully consistent with the elements of 
MERIT offered a 9–16 month intervention,78 with changes 
in the later trial being detectable several years following 
the therapy.79 Finally, two small randomized controlled 
trials have reported that patients with schizophrenia and 
first episode psychosis with poor awareness of illness will 
accept the treatment (68% and 80% overall completion 
rates, respectively) without any adverse events and with 
significant changes in metacognition and awareness of ill-
ness, respectively.80,81
MIT-P
Background
MIT-P82 is an adaptation of MIT.83 MIT is a distinct 
approach to the treatment of personality based on the 
assumptions that maladaptive interpersonal schemas and 
metacognitive deficits in personality disorders are a bar-
rier to finding ways to meet one’s life goals to successfully 
navigate the challenges of social life. MIT is based on a 
structured and manualized set of procedures that guide 
therapists to engage patients and promote metacognition 
from the first contact to treatment conclusion. The thera-
peutic action of MIT follows a series of well-defined steps 
which begins with the development of a collaborative case 
formulation, followed by the elicitation of detailed autobio-
graphical episodes, the detection of affects and their links 
with thoughts and actions, the gathering of more autobio-
graphical memories to paint a clear picture of underlying 
interpersonal schemas, and the formation of hypotheses 
about these schemas and the use of that knowledge to plan 
ways to change those schemas.
Following the development of a shared formulation, 
MIT focuses on helping patients achieve a critical and 
reflective distance from maladaptive interpersonal schemas 
and promote opportunities for the experience of healthy ele-
ments of the self within the flow of life outside of sessions 
as well as behavioral activation. Interpersonal processes 
are a major focus of MIT, and attention is paid to the 
prevention and repair of ruptures of therapeutic alliance, 
meta-communication between the therapist and patient, and 
guided behavioral homework experiments. MIT has recently 
gained empirical support in two structured case series84,85 
and in a pilot randomized controlled trial for a short-term 
group approach.86 The extension of MIT to psychosis was 
supported by a range of research, some of which is shared 
with the knowledge base of MERIT including findings that 
alterations exist in metacognitive functioning87,88 and narra-
tive structure89 in psychosis and that maladaptive interper-
sonal schemas can be detected in schizophrenia and linked 
to functional outcomes.90,91
Practice
MIT-P shares with MIT a focus on the aim of developing 
a shared formulation of psychological functioning, and 
carefully follows the same procedures outlined in MIT. In a 
manner similar to MERIT, it also assumes that many patients 
with psychotic disorders may initially lack the metacogni-
tive capacity to arrive at a detailed formulation of their own 
maladaptive interpersonal schemas and be able to think criti-
cally about their mental states. It thus works initially, when 
necessary, to build in a very gradual manner basic levels 
of metacognitive capacity to understand one’s mind, taking 
into account that this capacity continuously fluctuates over 
time in psychotic patients. On this basis, as soon as possible, 
MIT-P therapists elicit narrative episodes in order to form a 
shared understanding of patients’ basic experiences of their 
lived interpersonal world.
MIT-P further operates under the assumption that posi-
tive symptoms may be a barrier to healthy metacognitive 
function, and that, reciprocally, insufficient metacognitive 
capacity can contribute to symptoms. As such, MIT-P also 
includes detailed techniques for addressing symptoms.92 
These include initially empathic responses to suffering caused 
by these symptoms, normalizing patients’ inner experience, 
and promoting cognitive and behavioral mastery of suffering 
and related psychosocial challenges. Once these steps have 
been achieved, therapists seek to elicit narrative episodes in 
which a symptom occurs, promote patients’ understanding of 
the relationship between emotional distress and symptoms, 
and explore how maladaptive interpersonal schemas may 
trigger the emergence of positive symptoms. Finally, patients 
are guided to use their new understanding of themselves and 
others in order to respond to symptoms. For example, they 
can realize that when they appraise themselves as strong, 
persecutory views of others as more powerful and malevolent 
are no longer necessary.
Evidence
To date, the primary evidence supporting MIT-P includes a 
series of case studies.82,83,92,93 Taken together, this evidence 
is preliminary but offers a basis for future research into the 
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feasibility, tolerability, and efficacy of this treatment among 
symptomatic patients.
Discussion
In this paper, we have reviewed rapidly expanding work on 
metacognition and the ways in which this construct is inform-
ing novel interventions for working with people presenting 
with psychosis. Each of these treatments target metacognition 
in different ways using differing definitions of the term. These 
treatments further differ in their format: two were developed 
from existing treatments for other disorders, and two were 
developed primarily for persons with psychosis. Thus, the 
question remains whether these treatments are meaningfully 
connected to one another or whether they are only arbitrarily 
associated by different usages of the same key words.
In response, we suggest that our review offers several 
ways in which these treatments could be considered as 
meaningfully linked. First, each is concerned with something 
beyond what people with psychosis think about themselves 
and their lives. Each of these four approaches is interested 
in how patients with severe mental illness think about them-
selves. Metacognitive Therapy looks at immediate reactions 
that frame the meaning of thoughts and how their cognitive 
system works ultimately leading to better ways to cope or deal 
with maladaptive ideas. MIT-P looks at the social schemas 
that underlie interpretations of psychotic experience. Meta-
cognitive Training looks at how persons process information 
and the respective awareness of distorted processes, while 
MERIT is concerned with how persons integrate information 
to form larger pictures of their lives.
Second, each of these approaches is more concerned with 
why people make dysfunctional decisions and take maladap-
tive actions rather than what comprised those decisions and 
actions. Metacognitive Therapy sees dysfunctional behavior 
as stemming from assumptions about general classes of ideas, 
while MIT-P views maladaptive actions as imperfect but 
understandable reactions to unmet human needs. Metacogni-
tive Training examines identifiable gaps in self-awareness and 
how persons process information within the flow of life, while 
MERIT is concerned with enhancing the processes which 
allow persons to have a coherent and cohesive sense of oneself 
and others available to them naturally within the flow of life.
Despite their differences, each of these treatments is true 
to the larger construct of metacognition and is focused on 
persons’ relationships to their mental experiences, promoting 
various forms of self-understanding which allow for better 
self-management. Each can be further distinguished from 
other cognitive- and skills-based approaches to the treatment 
of psychosis in their emphasis on sense-making rather than 
learning a new specific thing to say, think, or do in a given 
situation.
Regarding the differences in how best to define meta-
cognition and thus how outcome is understood, we return to 
Moritz and Lysaker’s7 analysis of Flavell’s9 original use of 
the term. In particular we, as is suggested in that paper, see 
each of these approaches as mapping onto a different part of 
the spectrum of metacognitive activities. At the more discrete 
corner of the spectrum, we see Metacognitive Therapy as illu-
minating immediate reactions and reflections as they emerge 
in the moment across situations, while MIT-P similarly seeks 
to find interpersonal schemas that exist across situations and 
also shape one’s interpretations and responses to experience. 
On the other side of the metacognitive spectrum, Metacog-
nitive Training makes plain the intricate processes at play 
as persons make decisions and respond to the social world, 
while MERIT offers a glimpse into the complex systems 
which enable a sense of self and others to be available and 
to evolve within the flow of life.
In terms of the future, we suggest that this review provides 
opportunities for important future research questions. This 
review demonstrates that none of these treatment models on 
their own adequately accounts for how people know them-
selves and come to decide how to lead a life that is uniquely 
their own. More sophisticated and nuanced models are needed 
that incorporate each piece of the metaphorical elephant 
grasped by each approach. Also, each approach has much to 
learn from the others, and the development of future hybrid 
approaches seems an important avenue to explore.
Finally, there are limitations to this review. We have 
explored only treatments linked to psychosis; other 
approaches to metacognition have thus not been considered 
here due to space limitations. Space also did not allow for a 
more qualitative exploration of how each treatment is expe-
rienced by patients and how each responds to the recovery 
needs of patients, needs which go beyond symptoms and 
involve the recapturing of coherent self-experience and 
agency. More also remains to be explored about just how this 
treatment really diverges from CBT as well as interfaces with 
more interpersonal and psychodynamic forms of treatment.
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